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Introduction: How Sound Is the Cor-
porate Governance of Chinese Com-
panies?
How sound is the corporate governance 
of Chinese listed companies? This is the ques-
tion that motivates this chapter. Before detail-
ing this, let us touch on the cases of countries 
other than China. After the Asian Currency 
Crisis broke out in 1997, the soundness of the 
corporate governance in practice in the cri-
sis-affected countries has been severely ques-
tioned. Behind this development, there exists 
strong motivation to fi nd out the causes of the 
crisis itself. There already published a num-
ber of researches by European and American 
academics, who were strongly motivated by 
the fact that European and American inves-
tors were severely harmed by the crisis. 
Main fi nding of these research is that 
the capital structure of Asian fi rms, especially 
that of fi rms in Southeast Asian countries like 
Indonesia, is "special."1 These studies have 
pointed out that in many listed companies 
controlled by their founders and their fami-
lies, these families of owner-managers can "ex-
ploit" minority shareholders of listing shares. 
However, The Economist, in its survey of 
Asian businesses, asserts that this is not the 
case with Chinese corporations and that over-
seas investors investing in China can feel rest 
assured, because the state-owned corporations 
in China are completely different from South-
east Asian corporations controlled by eth-
nic-Chinese entrepreneurs, in the sense that 
these corporations, "owned by all the people," 
are free from any possibilities that the found-
ing families would refuse to let go of their 
managerial rights.2 But is this really true? The 
purpose of this chapter is to probe into this 
question.
The history of state-owned enterprise 
reform in China - involving changes from the 
system of people's ownership to the contract 
responsibility system, the recognition of pro-
prietary rights, and privatization - can also be 
regarded as the history of changes in insti-
tutional arrangements concerning the capi-
tal structure of corporations. This paper con-
siders it rather plausible to assume that such 
changes in institutional arrangements must 
have affected the performance of corpora-
tions by changing their capital structure. The 
capital structure shows, primarily, the sourc-
es from which the company is procuring its 
funds. But in actuality, the suppliers of capital 
are given the rights to partake in the decision 
on how the profi ts should be distributed, or, 
particularly in the case of the project's failure, 
in the decision on who should assume what 
sort of responsibilities and exercise what sort 
of decision-making authorities. Through this 
arrangement, the fund suppliers perform the 
role of governing the company and its manag-
ers.
4.1 Corporate Governance and Busi-
ness Strategies
Competitiveness of a company can be 
discussed from a variety of perspectives. It can 
be assessed not only from the perspective of 
corporate governance, as will be done here, 
but also from a number of other perspec-
tives such as those concerning the adequacy 
of corporate strategy, the quality of managers, 
and organizational health. The interactions 
among these various factors can be under-
stand as follows, with reference to the struc-
ture of balance sheet.
In order for a company to earn a prof-
it, it must make decisions on investment in 
plants and facilities, or in intangible assets, 
and on recruitment and allocation of employ-
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ees. The fi nal outcome of its managerial and 
strategic decisions on how to invest and how 
to allocate its employees is reduced to how 
the company's whole asset is assorted. And 
ideally, the assortment is supposed to show it-
self in the asset side of the balance sheet. The 
corporate strategy of a company shows how 
the company tries to secure a profi t.
On the other hand, in order to invest 
in such assets, the company must procure the 
necessary funds. It is expressed as the capital 
structure on the procurement side of the bal-
ance sheet that disclose from where the com-
pany has procured the funds, and what lia-
bilities it owes, and to whom. As pointed out 
already, the capital structure shows, straight-
forwardly and primarily, the sources from 
which a company is procuring its funds, and 
in what forms, in the form of equity or debt. 
But each of the securities, i.e., equity or debt, 
is allocated two types of rights in different 
ways; namely, the right to receive income in 
the predetermined form (i.e., the cash-fl ow 
right), and the right to make decisions over 
corporate strategy, investment, or personnel 
(i.e., the control right). It is in accordance 
with the combination of these two rights that 
the behavior of the manager is disciplined. In 
this sense, the mechanism of corporate gover-
nance is embedded in the capital structure or 
design of securities. And the role of the cap-
ital structure, or corporate governance, is to 
check on whether the corporate strategy as 
manifested on the balance sheet, or the man-
ager who has adapted that strategy is harm-
ing all stakeholders' interests. It is possible to 
say, in other words, that the capital structure 
shows not simply who is supplying funds to 
the company, but also who can govern the be-
havior of the company or its manager. 
Thus, by conceiving that the corpo-
rate strategy and corporate governance struc-
ture are expressed on the asset side and on 
the procurement side of its balance sheet, re-
spectively, it is made clear that how the com-
pany's behavior should be assessed. Even if 
the corporate strategy works well, so long as 
there is something wrong with the relation-
ship among its stakeholders, namely, with its 
corporate governance, the company will fail. 
Changhong and Kelon, to be examined be-
low, are the cases in point. It is of course the 
case that a fi rm with inadequate corporate 
strategy will fail to earn a profi t, even if its cor-
porate governance looks perfect.  
This chapter analyzes from the per-
spective explained above the following three 
major household electric appliances fi rms 
in China: Sichuan Changhong, a corporate 
group abridged hereafter as "Changhong," 
which is headed by Sichuan Changhong Elec-
tronic Holding Company and includes Sin-
chan Changhong Electric Co., Ltd. as a list-
ed company; Guangdong TCL, a corporate 
group abridged hereafter as "TCL," which is 
headed by Guangdong TCL Holding Com-
pany and includes TCL Communication 
Equipment Co., Ltd. (abbreviated as TCL 
Communication), and TCL Holdings Interna-
tional (abbreviated as TCL International) be-
long to as listed companies; and Guangdong 
Kelon, a corporate group abridged hereafter 
as "Kelon," which is headed by Guangdong 
Kelon (Rongsheng) Holding Company and 
includes Guangdong Kelon Electric Co., Ltd. 
as a listed company.3 Table 1 summarises pro-
fi les of the three companies.
4.2 Changhong
Changhong, headquartered in Mian-
yang City, Sichuan Province, is the largest col-
or TV manufacturer in China. It has devel-
oped as a typical state-owned enterprise with 
close relations with the local government. Af-
ter growing by leaps and bounds from the late 
1980s until the end of the 1990s, the compa-
ny got stagnated since the beginning of the 
2000s.This led to a change in its manage-
ment. By the end of 2002, there has been no 
announcement of privatization of the compa-
ny.4
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4.2.1 Changhong, the Hero of Local 
Manufacturers
Throughout the 1990s, Changhong was 
the hero of China's local electric applianc-
es manufacturers. In August 1989, Chang-
hong became a "rebel" by launching a pol-
icy for bargain sale of its TVs in defi ance of 
the regulated price. This action ignited what 
is known as the First TV Price War. The gov-
ernment, in its effort to arrest the infl ationary 
trend, had introduced in the preceding year 
a 900-RMB consumption tax on TV sets. How-
ever, TVs were much in demand by ordinary 
people who were earning increasingly great-
er incomes and were eager to upgrade their 
living conditions. With a view to meeting this 
popular aspiration, Changhong defi ed the 
regulated price imposed by the central gov-
ernment, and reduced the price of a TV set 
by 350 RMB. Changhong was appreciated as 
"a friend of ordinary people," and the "hero 
of local fi rms". It should be noted, however, 
it is said that when Changhong launched this 
price-cutting policy, it was desperately run-
ning short of fund, having only a little over 
1,000 RMB  cash in hand, while saddled with 
a huge inventory of 200,000 TV sets worth 320 
million RMB. Unable to borrow the operating 
fund from banks, it is said that the company 
have taken recourse to price reduction as the 
last resort to obtain what little cash it might 
be able to. Given the fact that not only Chang-
hong, but also other TV manufacturers across 
the country were having huge inventories, the 
government had no choice but to tacitly ap-
prove Changhong's price reduction.5
One factor that made it possible for 
Changhong to facilitate the drastic price re-
duction in response to the market condition 
was the fact that the company had been rap-
idly expanding its productive capacity. Chang-
hong became the industry leader in terms 
of productive capacity, by boosting its annu-
al TV manufacturing capacity to the one mil-
lion mark in 1988 for the fi rst time as a Chi-
nese electric appliances manufacturer, and 
then actually turning out one million TV sets 
in 1990. The expansion of the productive ca-
pacity was undertaken in response to the mar-
ket condition of the time, where TV sets were 
absolutely short in supply. 
4.2.2 Piled-up Inventries and Resig-
nation of CEO Ni Runfeng
However, the great leap forward by Chang-
hong came to a standstill in the latter half of 
the 1990s, as the market for TVs which had 
been characterized by an excess demand was 
now hit by a glut. As shown in Table 1, the in-
dustry's productive capacity in 1995 became 
almost twice the sales volume, and in the face 
of this change in the market condition each 
TV manufacturer was forced to change its cor-
porate strategy.
Despite the drastically changed mar-
ket condition, Changhong failed to work out 
a clear-cut sales strategy promptly enough. 
While TCL, in its quest to gain a competi-
tive edge in marketing, as will be pointed 
out later, began to organize its own network 
of wholesalers as early as 1991, it was not un-
til 1996 that Changhong tied up with Henan 
Zhengzhou Stationary and Department Store 
(abridged hereafter as Zheng-Bai-Wen), an 
emerging distribution company. Zheng-Bai-
Wen adopted a strategy of doing business by 
means of a "wholesaler's check-and-invoice 
system," whereby it purchased Changhong's 
products by drawing bills underwritten by the 
Zhengzhou Branch of the China Construction 
Bank, and the products were delivered direct-
ly from Changhong to individual retail stores, 
with the wholesalers concerned issuing the in-
voices to the retail stores. Zheng-Bai-Wen's 
strategy was aimed at building a stable "trian-
gle of credit" among itself, its wholesalers, and 
retail stores, and at increasing price compet-
itiveness by taking advantage of the economy 
of scale presented by Changhong's produc-
tive capacity. Through this alliance, Zheng-
Bai-Wen and Changhong became deeply com-
mitted to each other to such an extent that in 
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1997 Zheng-Bai-Wen purchased the TVs man-
ufactured by fi ve of Changhong's TV produc-
tion lines, which accounted for 30% of the 
company's total TV production at the time. 
After concluding the tie-up deal, Changhong 
continued to expand its productive capac-
ity, which is reported to have reached a 12 
million sets-a-year level in 1997. Changhong 
seems to have left the marketing activities to-
tally to Zheng-Bai-Wen, and concentrating its 
own managerial resources into expansion of 
productive capacity.
However, this strategy failed. In 1998 
Zheng-Bai-Wen's performance took a turn 
for the worse, and fi nally became insolvent 
in 1999, leaving Changhong saddled with a 
huge stockpile of TVs and faced with an es-
calating cash crunch. At the end of 1998, 
Zheng-Bai-Wen's sales had decreased by 56%, 
and Changhong and Construction Bank, sur-
prised by the unsound performance termi-
nated their dealings with Zheng-Bai-Wen in a 
fl urry. According to the annual report of Si-
chuan Changhong Electric Co., Ltd., a list-
ed company, of the account receivable that 
stood at a little more than 6 billion RMB at 
the beginning of 1998, the amount receivable 
from Zheng-Bai-Wen was 1.7 billion RMB, 
but the latter amount was reduced to 700 mil-
lion RMB by the end of the year. In contrast, 
Changhong's own inventories doubled from 
350 billion RMB at the beginning of 1998 to 
700 billion RMB at the year's end. Chang-
hong's cash fl ow during the year registered a 
net outfl ow of 13,621 million RMB (accord-
ing to Sichuan Changhong Electric Co.'s an-
nual report for 1998). This means that the 
company was facing an extremely serious li-
quidity crisis, because this amount was in ex-
cess of the company's operating income, or 
a little less than its liquid assets in the same 
year. President Ni Runfeng of Changhong re-
signed his post in June 2000, most likely from 
a sense of responsibility for the serious deteri-
oration in Changhong's performance.6
4.2.3 Contract Responsibility System 
Period
The history of Changhong's growth can 
be broadly classitied into two periods: the "pe-
riod of growth with the market expansion," 
which lasted from the latter half of the 1980s 
to the early half of the 1990s, when the policy 
of aggressive expansion of the company's pro-
ductive capacity helped its rapid growth; and 
the subsequent "period of expansion out of 
tune with changes in the market condition," 
the period since the latter half of the 1990s, 
when the company continued to expand its 
productive capacity even after the market be-
came glutted with TVs.
Why did Changhong continue expand-
ing its productive capacity persistently? In par-
ticular, why did they keep an "excess invest-
ment" even after the market was fl ooded with 
an excess supply of TVs since the mid-1990s? 
There must have been a number of factors. 
But When focusing on excess investment, it is 
possible to claim that there must have been 
something wrong with corporate governance 
concerning the decision-making on invest-
ment. This leads to a question as to how the 
company's fi nancial structure, with its bind-
ing effect on the way in which corporate gov-
ernance was carried out, was constituted, or 
as to what decisions were made by the stake-
holders who were involved in corporate gov-
ernance.
Let us sum up the changes that Chang-
hong's fi nancial structure went through. In 
the period until the mid-1980s, when China 
was under a planned economy, a two-piece set 
of an investment opportunity and the neces-
sary capital fund was allocated to each state-
owned enterprises. Given this state, the very 
concept of corporate governance in the sense 
of properly guiding a corporation's invest-
ment behavior was non-existent. Subsequent-
ly, a distinction among a corporation's funds 
on hand, its internally generated funds, and 
its externally procured funds were vague.
And the contract responsibility system, 
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which was introduced in 1987, might be char-
acterized as a system of quasi debt contract.7
In the same year, Changhong, as part of re-
covering its corporate autonomy, made a con-
tract with Mianyang Municipal Government, 
who were the representative of its owners. 
The contract required to pay part of its prof-
its to the municipal government. Under this 
contract responsibility arrangement the gov-
ernment as the supplier of the invest, the cor-
poration or its management pledged to pay a 
fi xed amount of its profi t to the investing gov-
ernment, and thereby to distribute its surplus 
profi t. This arrangement is different from an 
ordinary contract between a corporation and 
its shareholders. Under the latter contract, or-
dinary shareholders are provided with the de-
cision-making power, such as the voting pow-
er and the power to appoint and dismiss the 
manager, as well as the right to share in the 
company's profi ts in the form of a dividend, 
provided that the company's operation proves 
profi table. (The dividend is an income the 
size of which is not fi xed in advance.) Howev-
er, under the contract deal between Chang-
hong and the Mianyang Municipal Govern-
ment, the government was alloted not only 
with the " cash fl ow right," in the form to re-
ceive a predetermined income stream from 
the profi t on a continuous basis, but also with 
the "decision-making right," such as to ap-
point and dismiss the manager, and was thus 
capable of dismissing the manager when the 
company failed to perform well. The contract 
deal between Changhong and Mianyang Mu-
nicipal Government was rather similar to a 
contract of debt, because of the ways in which 
the right to cash fl ow and the decision-mak-
ing power were defi ned. An ordinary con-
tract of debt would provide the company or 
its manager with the right to dispose of sur-
plus profi ts, if any, on the one hand, while set-
ting the size of cash fl ow at a fi xed level. Fix-
ing the amount of cash fl ow at a certain level 
would have the effect of reducing the amount 
of free cash fl ow as a source of investment 
fund available for the manager, and thus pre-
venting the manager from making an excess 
investment.8 It is probable that the contract 
deal between Changhong and Mianyang Mu-
nicipal Government was performing a func-
tion similar to a "quasi debt." If this was ac-
tually the case, we can say that the contract 
responsibility system was functioning a role of 
preventing ineffi cient investment.
On the other hand, Changhong was 
able to make large investments in the peri-
od from 1987 to 1993 because the contract 
deal in 1987 made it possible for the compa-
ny to retain a portion of its internally generat-
ed funds. There is an episode about the con-
tract deal. In 1998, the second year since the 
contract responsibility system went into effect, 
Changhong earned a profi t totaling 197 mil-
lion RMB. According to the terms of the con-
tract deal specifi ed at the beginning of the 
year, 40 million RMB of this amount was sup-
posed to be paid to the government, and the 
remaining 157 million RMB would have be-
come the company's retained profi t. However, 
the municipal government's fi nancial bureau 
insisted that "the government should take a 
large share of the profi t, the corporation a 
medium share, and employees a small share" 
as dictated by the central government policy 
in effect at the time, and that the terms of the 
contract deal should be revised so that 157 
million RMB would be paid to the govern-
ment, and 40 million RMB would be retained 
by the company. Changhong fl atly turned 
down the fi nancial bureau's demand on the 
grounds that the contract was legally bind-
ing, and could not be changed arbitrarily. Ul-
timately the settlement of the matter was left 
in the care of the Party Committee of Mian-
yang and Mianyang Municipal Government. 
The party committee and the municipal gov-
ernment found the contract deal effective, 
and ruled the matter in favor of Changhong. 
Furthermore, the municipal government con-
cluded a long-term contract which set the 
standard annual payment to the government 
at 40 million RMB for the fi rst year, to be 
raised by the fi xed rate of 7.2% a year for a to-
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tal of 7 years. The signing of this new contract 
deal allowed Changhong to secure a retained 
profi t on a stable basis, and to expand its pro-
ductive capacity.9
In the period from 1987, the year 
when the contract responsibility system was 
launched, until 1993, Changhong expand-
ed its production capacity above one million 
TV sets a year, and its output jumped from 
423,000 sets to 1,593,000 sets. In retrospect, 
and given especially the subsequent rapid ex-
pansion of the market for TV sets, the steps 
Changhong took to expand its capacity by 
the margin mentioned above were justifi able 
as rational behavior. And one can conclude 
that, in the sense that the contract deal en-
abled the company to secure a stable fl ow of 
retained profi ts, which in turn prevented it 
from failing to take advantage of most, if not 
all, of the precious investment opportunities, 
the contract deal had the effect of preventing 
under-investment at the least.
4.2.4 After the Listing Its Shares 
Following the listing of its shares in 
1994, however, Changhong's corporate gov-
ernance structure underwent signifi cant 
changes, so signifi cant as to produce the im-
pression that the proper agents of corporate 
governance had disappeared. Consequent 
upon the listing of Changhong's shares, the 
role of the government changed from that of 
a quasi creditor to that of an ordinary share-
holder. As a result, the "subject" who would 
play "the role of a debtor" disappeared fi rst. 
The fi nancial structure of the listed compa-
ny shows that the ratio of total liabilities to 
net worth is low, and, moreover, most of the 
liabilities take the form of trade credits such 
as accounts payable and promissory notes 
payable. This means that, whereas previous-
ly debts, and in particular borrowings from 
banks used to invest the creditors with the 
power of governance, this channel of gover-
nance by creditors was now shut down, too. 
On the other hand, a glance at the composi-
tion of shareholders reveals that the holding 
company which represents the "state share", 
is the largest shareholder, controlling a domi-
nant portion of the company's shares (Figure 
1). Now, if one looks at the capital structure, 
which is heavily concentrated in the largest 
shareholder and that creditors are thinly dif-
fused and the amount of liabilities is extreme-
ly small, it becomes clear that only the hold-
ing company, which is the largest shareholder 
of Changhong, and the government behind 
it, have large enough voices to control the be-
havior of Changhong. 
Well, there would have been nothing 
wrong with this state so long as the govern-
ment's intention was in line with the goal of 
maximizing the corporate value. At Chang-
hong, however, some developments took 
place whereby the government's motivation 
seems to have either detracted from the cor-
porate value, or worked against the minority 
shareholders' interests. Of these, the former 
problem, namely, the problem concerning a 
loss in the corporate value that could result 
from the major shareholder's behavior was 
related to the question of how President Ni 
Runfeng was treated. Under a heavy concen-
tration of ownership, the largest sharehold-
er is endowed with the power to appoint and 
dismiss the manager on the basis of his evalu-
ation as to whether the latter is acting in line 
with the objective of maximizing the corpo-
rate value. This arrangement will be free from 
trouble when the largest shareholder himself 
is working to maximize the corporate value. 
In the case of Changhong, however, the larg-
est shareholder was the government, and its 
decision from its motive as the government 
injured the corporate value.
As pointed out already, Ni Runfeng, the 
restorer of Changhong, resigned the post of 
President, presumably being blamed for the 
failure of the tie-up with Zheng-Bai-Wen, and 
for the expanding stockpile and the deterirat-
ing cash fl ow that resulted from the failed tie-
up. It may be said that the decision to let Ni 
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Runfeng resign was in accordance with the 
principle of maximizing the corporate val-
ue. Subsequently, the young successor to Ni 
Runfeng, named Zhao Yong, who was born 
in the 1960s, went about adjusting produc-
tion and reducing the inventory. These mea-
sures were quite proper for dealing with the 
crunch in liquidity that was caused by the ex-
panded inventory. Nonetheless, the invento-
ry adjustment fell into disgrace with the larg-
est shareholder, namely, Sichuan Provincial 
Government, or Mianyang Municipal Govern-
ment. It is said that government bureaucrats 
were outraged because Changhong's decision 
to slow production in order to adjust its in-
ventory pushed down the gross industrial out-
put of Sichuan Province, thereby hurting the 
bureaucrats' records of performance. And in 
April 2001, Ni Runfeng returned in his for-
mer post of President all of a sudden, and 
Zhao Yong was transferred to a bureaucrat-
ic post in Mianyang Municipal Government. 
It is reported that Changhong, immediately 
following Ni Runfeng's comeback, cornered 
a huge quantity of cathode-ray tubes and be-
gan to pursue expanding production once 
Figure 1  Ownership Structure of Sichuan Changhong Electric Co., Ltd (as of 2000 yearend)
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again. Given the declining prices of TV sets, 
and the glut of production capacity, such an 
action seems to bring about an ineffi cient in-
vestment and a fall in the corporate value. As 
a matter of fact, the company's operation is 
predicted to fall into the red in 2001 (accord-
ing to the offi cial announcement of January 
25, 2001).
Now, let us turn to the second problem 
mentioned above, namely the problem con-
cerning the possibility that the largest share-
holder will behave in ways harmful to the in-
terests of minority shareholders or outside 
shareholders in order to safeguard his own in-
terests. When Changhong was undergoing a 
business slowdown in 1998, it took advantage 
of the information asymmetry, procuring ex-
ternal funds by issuing new shares, on the one 
hand, while extending an enormously large 
credit to the holding company, its largest 
shareholder, on the other.10 In other words, a 
large amount of fund procured from without 
the company was passed onto the company's 
largest shareholder. As a result of this manip-
ulation undertaken amidst the business slow-
down in 1998, the total assets per share de-
creased by a large margin, but apparently the 
largest shareholder alone was compensated 
for this loss.11
The government's serving as the larg-
est shareholder of a corporation is open to 
question on several counts. To begin with, the 
government's objective can possibly contra-
dict with the objective of maximizing the cor-
porate value. A second problem, that tends 
to present itself in a situation where corpora-
tion's shares are heavily concentrated in the 
government as its largest shareholder, is the 
possibility that the government, in its capac-
ity as the largest shareholder, will try to safe-
guard its own interests at the cost of minority 
shareholders' and outside shareholders' in-
terests. In order to avoid these problems, it is 
necessary to reduce the government's com-
mitment in corporations. In circumstances 
where the government's motive as the share-
holder and its own motive at odds with each 
other, as in the fi rst case above, it is impera-
tive to let the government completely shed its 
role as a shareholder, that is to say, let the cor-
poration go private.
As of February 2001, however, no report 
has yet been made by the press about any 
move being made at Changhong toward its 
privatization.
4.3 Kelon 
The situation has been much the same 
at Kelon, the leading manufacturer refriger-
ators, there was a series of reshuffl ings of top 
managers since 1998, and the company's op-
eration remained unstable. Finally in Novem-
ber 2001, a decision was made that the gov-
ernment's shares in the company would be 
soldout, then the company was privatized 
while its operation has been yet to be stabi-
lized remained unstable.
4.3.1 From Pan Ning, the Founder to 
Wang Guorui
Headquartered in Yonggui Township, 
Shunde City, Guangdong Province, Kelon is 
a household electric appliances manufactur-
er good at manufacturing products equipped 
with heat exchangers, such as refrigerators 
and air conditioners. Especially in the fi eld 
of refrigerators, it boasts of a large market 
share, and is competing for the top position 
with Haier of Shandon Province. In 1984, the 
founder of Kelon, Pan Ning, then an offi cial 
at the Bureau of Machinery Industry of the 
Rongqi Township Government of Shunde, 
and several of his colleagues and friends es-
tablished a company that became the prede-
cessor of Kelon. Since Deng Xiaoping's visit to 
the company in January 1992 on his Southern 
Tour Lecture, when he gave there an impor-
tant lecture of about 40 minutes at the com-
pany, Kelon has been regarded as a represen-
tative of village and township enterprises. 
Kelon has laid the foundation for its de-
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velopment by their investment decisions it 
made amidst a sharp drop in demand that 
was triggered by the Tian'anmen Incident of 
1989.12 In the latter half of the 1980s there 
was a rush of new household electric applianc-
es companies entering the market at such a 
rate that it was apprehended that there would 
be an oversupply. And after the Tian'anmen 
Incident, the operations of a large number of 
village and township enterprises in the elec-
tric appliances industry became stagnant, 
and many of the refrigerator manufacturers 
rushed to scale down their production lines. 
In the face of this apparently gloomy state of 
things, however, Pan Ning asserted that the 
existing production capacity was much small-
er than the huge potential demand that still 
remained untapped in China, and, according-
ly, Kelon went against the trend, continuing 
to expand its production capacity. And in the 
period of economic recovery and expansion 
that began immediately after Deng Xiaop-
ing's Southern Tour Lecture of January 1992, 
Kelon's investment decision bore fruit. Tak-
ing full advantage of economy of scale, Kelon 
maintained the largest share in the domes-
tic market for refrigerators for 10 consecutive 
years from 1990 to 1999.13 Kelon also adopt-
ed a marketing strategy so as to properly ca-
ter to varying consumer tastes in different ar-
eas. For instance, by selling products of the 
"Rongsheng" label in the rural area where the 
consumers show relatively stable preferenc-
es for brand-names, while selling products of 
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Figure 2  Ownership Structure of Kelon 
                (after the privatization in November 1, 2001)
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the Kelon label in urban areas along the sea-
coast where up-market products and frequent 
model-changes are much in demand. Kelon's 
strategy to sell products of different labels in 
different areas is said to have been also instru-
mental in sustaining the company's expansion 
when it was under Pan Ning's reign.14
Kelon has been procuring its funds in 
the following ways. In 1984, Pan Ning and 
other co-founders together laid out 4.5 mil-
lion RMB and established a township com-
pany under the auspice of Rongqi Township 
Government. Subsequently in 1992, Kelon in-
creased its capital by 80 million RMB by al-
lotting the new shares to its employees, and 
then proceeded onto establishing Kelon Elec-
tric Co., Ltd. In listing Kelon Electric's stock 
on the market, Kelon chose to do so on the 
Hong Kong market in 1996, not on the stock 
market within China. Kelon Electric's stock 
was thus listed as an "H share," which was re-
ceived considerably warmly in the exchange 
and fi nancial markets of Hong Kong, earn-
ing a reputation as the representative blue-
chip stock of China. When the H share was 
issued, it was strongly supported by leading fi -
nancial institutions of the West, with the re-
sult that constituting the list of the main sub-
scribers to the H share are such fi nancial 
fi rms as Citibank (with a 6.16% share of the 
stock as of the end of May 1999), Standard 
Chartered (12.31%), Hong Kong Shanghai 
Bank (HSBC; 12.04%), and Chase Manhat-
tan (10.19%). Citibank is even dispatching a 
non-executive director of Kelon Electric. It 
is worth noting, moreover, that at the time 
of the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997, when 
all the other H shares took sharp downturns 
and fell below their issue values, the price of 
Kelon's H share alone remained above its is-
sue value. This was partly because of impres-
sions that were formed about Kelon: its sta-
tus as a village or township enterprise imaged 
that it would not be strongly infl uenced by 
the government; and its pro-active attitude 
in moving some of its corporate functions to 
Hong Kong, and in improving communica-
tions with investors helped to form an image 
of Kelon as "a corporation being managed in 
the way present-day corporations should be," 
and as "a corporation in which the fi nancial 
people leads" (setting aside what this really 
means).
Meanwhile in the refrigerator market, 
and almost concurrently with the fl oating 
of Kelon's H share in 1996, products of for-
eign labels began to make inroads into China. 
As products bearing Japanese brand names 
such as Matsushita (National) and Sharp, and 
those bearing the American label of Whirl-
pool began to make inroads into China, 
Kelon was forced to fi ght an uphill battle. The 
position of Kelon was made all the more dif-
fi cult by the fact that, even though it had ex-
panded its productive capacity by establishing 
new production bases in Chengdu and Yingk-
ou, it failed to reinforce its marketing capabil-
ity to match well with this. Thus, Kelon, just 
like Changhong, was faced with the problem 
of imbalance between its productive and mar-
keting capacities. In its effort to overcome 
this problem, Kelon tried to adapt itself to the 
changed market situation by switching from 
the old marketing practices based on sales 
talks at drinking parties or on intimate per-
sonal relations to more rational and business-
like practices. When the process of transition 
was under way, however, Pan Ning witnessed 
that the marketing teams using the conven-
tional marketing methods outperformed the 
newly formed teams with their more ratio-
nal marketing methods; he reached a con-
clusion that he should resign by all means, so 
as to help accelerate the process of remodel-
ing Kelon into a rational corporate organiza-
tion.15
In line with this decision, Pan Ning, the 
founder of Kelon, resigned his post of the 
Holding Company President on the eve of 
the listing of the A share in 1998, and then 
also his post of the Holding Company?s Chair-
man at the beginning of 1999. Chinese cor-
porations that began to develop after China 
launched its policy of reform and openness 
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are generally "short-lived," and it is also very 
rare for managers who achieved success to 
step down to make way for younger succes-
sors. Thus, the "retirement of Kelon's found-
er" set a precedent for other companies. 
When Pan Ning stepped down, Wang Guor-
ui, who had served as his right-hand man for 
14 years since the company's foundation, suc-
ceeded to him. Upon assuming the offi ce, 
Wang Guorui announced that for the time be-
ing he would strive to work on the half of Pan 
Ning's 10-year plan that remained to be com-
pleted, namely, the buyout of Huabao, and 
the full-fl edged listing of the A share.16
4.3.2 The Negotiation about Merger 
and Its Aftermath
In the latter half of the 1990s, the do-
mestic economy of China as a whole changed 
from a state of undersupply to that of over-
supply, and companies that failed to adapt 
themselves to this changed economic climate 
were performing poorly. By around 1997, 
Huabao, which was manufacturing air condi-
tioners in Shunde, and Midea, which had be-
gan to change its product line-up, which used 
to be centered around small-sized household 
electric appliances like electric fans and wa-
ter heaters, into one centered around air con-
ditioners, were faced with this problem. At 
that juncture, Shunde Municipal Govern-
ment mapped out a plan to let Huabao and 
Midea merge with Kelon, and to establish 
an all-embracing household electric appli-
ances manufacturer whose product line-up 
would encompass a whole spectrum of white 
goods, ranging from large-sized goods all the 
way down to small-sized ones. Midea turned 
down the plan, fi ercely resisting it, and start-
ed to carry out a thoroughgoing reform plan, 
which included the adoption of a profi t cen-
ter approach.  
Consequently, in August 1998, Kelon 
ended up absorbing only Huabao, and boost-
ing its air-conditioner-manufacturing capacity 
to 1.5 million units a year, the largest in China 
at the time. But this merger brought Kelon's 
defi cient marketing capability into sharper fo-
cus. At the time of the merger, Kelon had al-
ready started manufacturing air conditioners, 
marketing them under its own label. Prod-
ucts of the Huabao label also held a certain 
share of the market. So it was decided that 
the two labels should remain in use side by 
side with each other. But in the absence of a 
clear-cut demarcation line defi ning the terri-
tory of each label, the marketing operation 
was thrown into confusion, and the compa-
ny's marketing agents and dealers fell into the 
defi cit.17 This bred a vicious circle by making 
the distributors distrustful of Kelon, which in 
turn adversely affected Kelon's own sales per-
formance as well as its earnings, which in turn 
acted as one of the factors that destabilized 
Kelon's operation.
4.3.3 Shunde Municipal Government  
Located in part of Guangdong Province 
that has traditionally been characterized as 
a commercial area, Shunde City is noted for 
its atmosphere oriented toward market econ-
omy. At the same time, however, the city has 
also lived under a strong infl uence of planned 
economy. Offi cials of the city recollect (in an 
interview) that following the national govern-
ment's adoption of the policy of reform and 
openness, "the city tried to stir up the local 
economy by making use of the advantages of 
planned economy." When a contract respon-
sibility system concerning taxation was in-
troduced, the city established a principle for 
the distribution of its tax revenue: one third 
of the fi scal revenue would be paid to supe-
rior authorities, one third would be retained 
for the city's own use, and the remaining one 
third would be invested in corporations (in 
the form of tax exemption and other expens-
es). In other words, the municipal govern-
ment created a setup whereby "the govern-
ment would become involved in the running 
of corporations" by actively allocating resourc-
es to corporations.18 Kelon developed from a 
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village and township enterprise, which was es-
tablished in Rongqi Township of Shunde City 
as a spin-off from the township government's 
bureau of machinery industry, as pointed out 
already. In the course of its development, it 
received favorable treatment from the town-
ship government in the form of tax exemp-
tions and funding for investment. It may be 
pointed out that Shunde Municipal Govern-
ment's fi nancial and other contributions to 
corporations within the city seem to have led 
it to feel entitled to commit itself deeply in 
the running of such corporations. And this at-
titude produced signifi cant effects on the op-
eration of Kelon.
4.3.4 From Wang Guorui to Xu Ti-
efeng  
The performance of Kelon in 1999, the 
fi rst year of Wang Guorui's reign after he suc-
ceeded to Pan Ning, was not so bad. In March 
2000, Wang Guorui carried out a sweep-
ing reshuffl e of the management, unseating 
the fi ve vice presidents who had helped de-
velop Kelon as Wang Guorui's comrades in 
arms, and replacing them by a fi ve-member 
"parachute troop" of specialists brought in 
from outside the company. Included among 
the paratroopers were: Li Guoming who, af-
ter successfully helping Kelon's listing its H 
share in the Hong Kong exchange market, 
had been serving as a link between inves-
tors in Hong Kong and Kelon, and who was 
now appointed vice president in charge of fi -
nance; Qu Yunbo, formerly a marketing con-
sultant, who was appointed vice president in 
charge of marketing; and Zong Xinyu, also 
formerly a consultant, who was appointed 
vice president in charge of corporate strate-
gy. In addition to carrying out this drastic or-
ganizational reshuffl e, Wang Guorui tried to 
change the company's orientation very rapid-
ly, by implementing measures such as diver-
sifi cation of its product line-up, and a switch 
in the marketing method. These measures 
were met with strong voices of opposition and 
criticism raised from within the company, 
and from local dealers and sales agents, and 
die makers and other suppliers, with the re-
sult that the company's operation was thrown 
into confusion.19 And all of a sudden in June 
2000, Wang Guorui announced that he him-
self would resign the post of President and be-
come Chairman, and Xu Tiefeng, then Vice 
Governor of Rongqi Township Government, 
would fi ll the post of President. Subsequently 
in October the same year, Li Guoming, whose 
name was associated with the popular image 
of Kelon as "a corporation in which the fi nan-
cial people have a strong say," left Kelon; and 
by the end of 2001, all of the fi ve "paratroop-
ers" resigned their posts. After assuming the 
offi ce of President, Xu Tiefeng, instead of go-
ing about straightening out the confused sit-
uation, has staked out, perhaps in the hope 
of making a new departure, an expansionary 
strategy which proposes to change the cor-
porate identity and to start undertaking the 
production of small-sized household electric 
appliances, and thus requires additional in-
vestments.
Since Pan Ning's resignation toward the 
end of 1998, Kelon's top management under-
went a series of personnel changes. It seems 
safe to say that these personnel reshuffl es be-
came necessary not because the successors to 
executive positions proved incompetent, but 
rather because the company was lacking in a 
mechanism for coordinating and readjusting 
the possible confl icts of interests between the 
management and other stakeholders. Given 
the absence of such a mechanism, it is highly 
probable that the decision-making process in 
the company will be readily politicized follow-
ing a departure of an infl uential leader. The 
Chinese media as "revolutionary undertak-
ings" ridiculed the repeated changes in the 
top leadership of Kelon that resulted from 
such politicized decision-making process.20 
4.3.5 Diffi culty in Change of Top 
Manager
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In changing its top leadership, Kelon 
faced diffi culties at two levels. At one level, 
it had a diffi cult time in coordinating inter-
nal governance involved in the discharging of 
one group of top managers and installation of 
another. At another, the way the government 
intervened in Kelon's operation, or the way in 
which governance from outside the company 
was performed, left something to be desired.     
In the period between 1990 and 1999, 
Kelon basically continued to perform well in 
terms of the manufacturing and marketing of 
its main products, as it continued to hold the 
largest share in the domestic market for re-
frigerators, its main line of business, for the 
10 consecutive years, and also the fi fth larg-
est share in the domestic market for air con-
ditioners. As of 2001, Kelon still remains fair-
ly competitive in terms of production volume, 
sales volume, and its brand image. Looked 
at in retrospect, however, it is possible to say 
that, even though Kelon has had chances to 
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Figure 3  Ownership Structure of TCL (as of April 16, 2002)
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grow much bigger, it seems to have failed to 
make full use of those chances, or failed to 
make investments necessary for attaining a 
further growth. In the latter half of the 1990s, 
not simply Kelon, but all the household elec-
tric appliances companies in China were in 
need of improving their business strategies 
as the prerequisite for growing further. Com-
pared with the considerable progress they 
had already made to expand their production 
capacities, their marketing capacities were 
falling behind. It was urgently necessary for 
these companies to overcome this problem by 
allocating greater portions of their resources 
to the improvement of their marketing capac-
ities.  
When pressed to change its strate-
gy, Kelon decided to meet the challenge not 
only by reorganizing its marketing section, 
but also by carrying out a personnel reshuf-
fl e to unseat the founder as the embodiment 
of an out-dated culture. As a result of mak-
ing this decision, Kelon had to simultaneous-
ly work on the task of changing its strategy, or 
reforming the way it carries out its business, 
and on the task of reforming the very struc-
ture of its corporate governance by choosing 
its new leadership. Wang Guorui's attempt to 
grapple with these tasks by radically reshuf-
fl ing the management fell through because of 
a fi erce opposition of the other stakeholders. 
For the fi rst time in 2000, Kelon posted a def-
icit amounting to 670 million RMB on a con-
solidated account basis.21
After its effort to simultaneously change 
its strategy and corporate governance failed, 
Kelon's operation was thrown into disorder. 
If a company gets caught in a situation like 
this, it is usually considered the responsibili-
ty of its main stakeholders, such as the largest 
shareholder and major creditors to take ac-
tions to iron out the tangle. The actions tak-
en by the major stakeholders of Kelon, which 
were supplying funds to it, were as follows. 
In the period from 1999 to March 2001, the 
main outside investors composed of infl uen-
tial fi nancial institutions, including Citibank, 
instead of taking a strong initiative in the gov-
erning of Kelon, sold off their own holdings 
of Kelon's stocks. As a result, the stock price 
fell so sharply that in October 2001 Kelon 
had to purchase its own H share to sustain 
the stock price. On the other hand, Kelon's li-
abilities consisted mostly of liquid liabilities 
resulting from trade credits, and the amount 
of borrowings from banks was small, which 
meant that there was no infl uential creditor, 
which in turn meant that Rongqi Township 
Government had a very large say as the larg-
est shareholder. As if catering to the wishes of 
Rongqi Township Government, Xu Tiefeng, 
the former Vice Governor of the township, 
was appointed to the post of Kelon's Presi-
dent. At the time some doubts were expressed 
as to whether the appointment of the former 
government bureaucrat to the post of pres-
ident of the listed company was indeed the 
best available choice.
When faced with the need to change 
its corporate strategy, Kelon tried in vain 
to implement a change concerning gover-
nance concurrently with changing its corpo-
rate strategy, throwing its operation into con-
fusion and instability. But given the fact that 
the township government was its most infl u-
ential stakeholder, it was subjected to the gov-
ernance enforced primarily by the township 
government, and in accordance with its own 
viewpoint. And this explains why Kelon's oper-
ation as a whole fell into confusion and disor-
der. As if trying to bring the state of confusion 
to an end, Ronggui Township Government 
(note that Rongqi Township and Guizhou 
Township merged with each other in 2000 to 
form Ronggui Township) announced on No-
vember 1, 2001, that of the 34.6% of its hold-
ings of Guangdong Kelon Electric's share, it 
would sell 20.6% to Shunde Greencool Enter-
prise Development Corporation. As a result 
of this transaction, a private corporation as 
the largest shareholder of Kelon replaced the 
township government, and Kelon was priva-
tized. We will return to this point later.
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4.4 TCL
TCL fi rst distinguished itself in the pro-
duction of wire line telephones, and then en-
tered the fi eld of TV manufacturing, becom-
ing one of the largest TV manufacturers in 
China. Having started as a state-owned enter-
prise, but without any outlays of capital funds 
from the government, the corporation is con-
sidered affi liated with the government only 
nominally, but not in practice. Aware that the 
situation such as this is not conducive to pro-
curing funds from outside, the corporation 
has managed to procure the funds necessary 
for fi nancing its growth by adopting a strat-
egy that attaches top priority to effi cient use 
of funds. Having been privatized early on by 
means of the management and employees' 
buyout system, the corporation is now trying 
to dissociate itself further from the govern-
ment.
4.4.1 The Start-up of TCL without 
Govenment's "Consideration"
The company group now known as TCL 
started as Huiyang District Electronics In-
dustry Corporation, which was established in 
1980, with 50 million RMB borrowed from a 
public source but without any equity capital 
invested by the government. At its inception 
it was launched as a corporation resulting 
from reorganization of the former Electron-
ics Industry Division, the Bureau of Machin-
ery Industry of Huiyang District Government. 
In 1981, Huiyang District Electronics Indus-
try Corporation established with corporations 
in Hong Kong a joint venture fi rm called 
TTK Home Electric Corporation, a manu-
facturer of magnetic recording tapes, and its 
tapes sold well and began to compete harsh-
ly with imported tapes of the Japanese fi rm 
TDK. However, when TDK sued the joint ven-
ture fi rm for infringing upon its intellectual 
property rights, Huiyang District Electronics 
Industry Corporation established a new joint 
venture with Hong Kong capital, TCL Com-
munication Equipment Corporation, a manu-
facturer of wire line telephones.22
After holding a certain share of the wire 
line telephone market, TCL in 1992 decid-
ed to enter the area of TV manufacturing. At 
the time, there were a large number of new 
entrants into the TV manufacturing industry, 
which was assured of a high profi t because it 
was under lax price regulation. However, TCL 
was not designated by the government as an 
approved manufacturer, and lacking in gov-
ernment approval, it was not able to borrow 
funds from banks. Unable to procure funds 
necessary for making investment in its own 
plants and equipment, TCL decided to make 
inroads into the TV manufacturing business 
in earnest through a very unique approach, 
namely, the approach of procuring TVs from 
other companies on an OEM (original equip-
ment manufacturing) basis for sale under its 
own label, rather than building its own plants 
for manufacturing TVs for itself. In April 
1995, TCL established Huizhou King Audio-
Visual Electronics Co., Ltd. as a joint venture 
with Changcheng Electronics Group in Hong 
Kong, and secured the production capacity 
for manufacturing 1.2 million color TVs per 
year, in return for providing the joint venture 
with an intangible asset of a marketing net-
work which had established through the mar-
keting of TVs under its own bland and wire 
line telephones.23 Subsequently, TCL contin-
ued to increase its share in the TV market 
by capitalizing on its superb marketing capa-
bility, and after the TV price war of 1996 was 
over, its share in the domestic market jumped 
to third place or higher.
4.4.2 The Cash Flow Management 
Model
Despite its status as a state-owned cor-
poration, TCL in reality has received little fi -
nancial support from the government. Both 
at the time of its inception, and at the time of 
its entry into the manufacturing of TVs, it was 
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unable to obtain the government's funding 
or preferential access to bank loans. Despite 
these odds stacked against it, TCL has man-
aged to undertake investments necessary for 
its growth, thanks primarily to its unique man-
agement strategy.
TCL's management strategy is unique 
because it gives overriding priority to allo-
cating management resources to market-
ing activities. When the company tries to 
make inroads into a certain market, it pro-
cures products from other companies under 
OEM arrangements, sells these products un-
der its own label through its own marketing 
network, and thereby secures and expands its 
market. Only after the company secures a cer-
tain market share, its starts investing in plants 
and equipment, and starts undertaking the 
in-house manufacturing of the product. The 
strategy was fi rst put into effect when the com-
pany made inroads into the TV market, and 
was subsequently applied to a series of other 
products, such as audio-visual products, wash-
ing machines, refrigerators, air conditioners, 
switches for light electrical appliances, and 
mobile phones.   
It was as early as 1990, much earli-
er than other household electric appliances 
manufacturers of China, that TCL began to 
establish its own network of wholesalers. Hav-
ing its own marketing network was important 
for TCL in two respects. First, and natural-
ly, such a network was important as a means 
of enabling it to sell the products bearing its 
label and collect the payments for the prod-
ucts without fail. In this regard, the market-
ing network went a long way toward helping 
the company retain a portion of its profi ts as 
the most important source of fi nding. And 
second, the very investment in the marketing 
network gained in value over years and be-
came an important asset, for use by the com-
pany in launching joint ventures with other 
companies, especially foreign companies with 
advanced technological expertise. At the time 
of the establishment of TCL Communica-
tion in 1985, TCL, lacking in both technolog-
ical know-how and an investment fund, had 
no choice but to rely on some foreign corpo-
rations. The only comparative advantage TCL 
could boast of at the time was the domestic 
marketing network of distributors affi liated 
with the then parent company of TCL, Hui-
yang Electronics Industry General Corpora-
tion, and TCL was able to establish the joint 
venture by capitalizing on this comparative 
advantage.
TCL's present operations can be bro-
ken down as follows, in the chronological or-
der by which they proved successful: 1) audio-
visual appliances including telephones and 
TVs (with TCL, as of the end of 2000, hold-
ing the largest, near 50%, share in the domes-
tic market for telephones, and occupying the 
top position in the marketing of color TVs on 
a value basis); 2) light electric appliances in-
cluding switches for residences (undertaken 
by TCL International, which enjoys the largest 
market share); 3) white goods such as washing 
machines; refrigerators, and air conditioners; 
and 4) personal computers (with TCL hold-
ing the fourth largest market share).24 Most 
of TCL's undertakings in these product areas, 
which now boast large market shares, were 
originally launched not on the basis of its 
technological competence, but rather follow-
ing a particular "equation" or dictum which 
ordains that: in making inroads into a new 
product area, be sure to procure the prod-
ucts from other companies on an OEM basis, 
for sale under the company's own label, and 
through the marketing network of its own; 
and the launching of in-house production, by 
way of buying out the supplier companies or 
launching joint ventures, should wait until af-
ter a certain market share has been secured. 
This method of starting out with the market-
ing of a new product procured through an 
OEM arrangement and then switching to in-
house production was fi rst applied successful-
ly to its TV business, and was later applied to 
white goods and other products in 1999 and 
after.25
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4.4.3 Distance from the Government
TCL has thus grown by fi nancing its invest-
ment funds out of cash fl ow generated from 
its operating profi ts. Having to fi nance its 
growth by its own cash fl ow means that TCL 
has not had any leeway to make excessive in-
vestment, and that it has not been able to af-
ford to make decisions that would run coun-
ter to the interests of outside stakeholders.26 
TCL had to adopt this strategy of fi nancing its 
growth by its own cash fl ow because it could 
not receive strong support from the govern-
ment, but the strategy has had the effect of 
freeing the company's present operations 
from strong government intervention. And 
when companies across the country were al-
lowed to reduce the percentages of govern-
ment-owned shares, TCL quickly took steps 
toward privatization by letting its employees 
purchase TCL Group Corporation's shares 
owned by Huizhou Municipal Government.
4.5 Privatization as a Means of 
Avoiding "Government Risk"
The foregoing three case studies on three 
leading household electric appliances man-
ufacturers of China have examined the rela-
tionships between these corporations and the 
government as a major shareholder, the re-
lationships between the government and the 
corporations' strategies, and their attitude to-
ward privatization. Now, looked at from the 
standpoints of these companies, what have 
been the main implications of the selling of 
state-owned shares, or privatization?
4.5.1 Distance between the "A Clar-
iting Ownership" and "Privati-
zation"
Corporate reform concerning ownership in 
China is carried out in two stages: settlement 
of ownership, and the selling of state-owned 
shares. With regard to the fi rst stage, corpo-
rations that were established in the period 
of planned economy were regarded as being 
owned by the entire people of the country, 
with no concrete defi nition made as to how 
the ownership of a specifi c company should 
be divided among its various stakeholders. In 
these companies, problems arise both in case 
a company is making a profi t, and in case it is 
losing money. In case a company, whose own-
ers are not well defi ned, is making a profi t, it 
is not clear as to who has the right to decide 
on how to dispose of this profi t. So long as the 
company has ample investment opportunities 
whose discounted present values are positive, 
it may keep investing in such opportunities. 
But when a company runs out of investment 
opportunities having positive discounted pres-
ent values, and if its owners were known, it 
would be able to distribute the profi t to these 
owners in the form of dividend. But since its 
owners are unknown, it cannot distribute the 
profi t to them as dividend. In such a circum-
stance, the profi t will be accumulated with-
in the company without being put to mean-
ingful uses, or will become part of a free cash 
fl ow for use in wasteful investment or con-
sumption.
On the other hand, in case the compa-
ny's operation does not go well, problems also 
arise. Assume, for instance, that it falls into a 
state of over indebtedness, with its total debts 
exceeding its total assets. If the company's 
shareholders were known, they should decide 
to take responsibility by repaying the debts 
with their own investment money. But since 
its shareholders are unknown, such a decision 
cannot be made, with the result that the cred-
itors interests, who should otherwise be pro-
tected, will not be protected. 
These problems arise if it is not clear as 
to who should receive the benefi ts and take 
the responsibility on behalf of the sharehold-
ers. These problems were not limited to state-
owned companies, but were common to vil-
lage and township companies and collective 
companies as well. Thus, the need to deter-
mine corporate ownership in order to over-
come these problems emerged as an impor-
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tant focus of corporate reforms in China in 
the early half of the 1990s.
4.5.2 "Government Risk"27
The second stage of corporate reforms con-
cerning ownership is the selling of state-
owned shares. Since this step was politically 
approved at the 15th Party Congress in 1997, it 
has been put into effect and has been a focus 
of much discussion. There are several reasons 
justifying why state-owned shares in corpora-
tions should be sold to private shareholders. 
The most important reason looked at from 
the perspective of the companies concerned, 
as evident in the foregoing three case stud-
ies, is the fact that having the government as a 
main shareholder involves a high risk, in the 
sense that there is a strong likelihood that the 
government's decision or purpose as a share-
holder of a company and the purpose of max-
imizing the corporate value often contradict 
with each other. As evident in the cases of 
Changhong and Kelon, the government often 
has a strong say in changing a corporation's 
management. It is perfectly in accord with 
the prescriptions of the Corporate Law that 
the government, by virtue of being the largest 
shareholder of a corporation, exerts strong 
infl uence on the governance of the company. 
Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the gov-
ernment has its own objective, and if it tries to 
impose that objective too strongly on the cor-
poration, the corporation's business will be 
adversely affected. In the case of Changhong, 
if what is reported is true, Sichuan Provincial 
Government, just in order to improve statisti-
cal records of the province, went to the extent 
of removing the top manager of the compa-
ny who tired to cut back on the company's ex-
cessive inventory. In the case of Kelon, too, it 
is said that Wang Guorui, the second-genera-
tion President, was forced to step down by the 
company's largest shareholder, Rongqi Town-
ship Government, because local dealers did 
not take kindly to his policy of reshuffl ing the 
managerial staff and reorganizing the market-
ing network as a means of helping the com-
pany grow from a local company into a na-
tional giant. If these pieces of information are 
true, it must be concluded that the decisions 
made by Sichuan Provincial Government and 
Rongqi Township Government were clearly at 
odds with the purpose of maximizing the cor-
porate values.
The government has its own objective, 
and it is quite natural for such an objective of-
ten proves to be different from the objective 
pursued by a corporation. However, by being 
the largest shareholder of a company in pres-
ent-day China, the government seems to run 
the risk of doing harm to the corporate val-
ue. In this sense, a corporation having the 
government as its largest shareholder is bur-
dened with a "government risk." In order to 
avoid this risk, it is desirable for companies to 
publicly release their shares held by the gov-
ernment, and become privately owned com-
panies. 
4.5.3 The Progress of the Privatiza-
tion in the Three Companies
In TCL and Kelon, out of the three 
companies dealt with in this paper, privatiza-
tion is already under way, with concrete de-
tails of the progress being reported in the 
Chinese media. Privatization is carried out 
not only through the selling of state-owned 
shares in the stock exchange market. Presum-
ably, many of the shares are sold through pri-
vate negotiations, because fi rms often expect 
that by taking this approach they will be able 
to enjoy, after privatization, a larger room of 
freedom in practicing corporate governance 
and in devising business strategies in ways ad-
vantageous to themselves. 
(i) Changhong
Changhong posted a defi cit in its mid-
year report in 2001, the fi rst report on the set-
tlement of accounts published after Ni Run-
feng's recovery as President. However, as of 
the end of 2002, no announcement has been 
made as to whether Sichuan Changhong Elec-
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tronic Group Corporation, the holding com-
pany for the company group as a whole, is 
scheduled for privatization.
(ii) TCL
Letting its employees purchase the 
state-owned shares in TCL Holdings carried 
out privatization of TCL. In March 1997, TCL 
Group was formally delegated by Huizhou 
Municipal Government to exercise the prop-
erty right of the state-owned assets based on 
the consignment management contract over 
the state owned asset. Then, in May of the 
same year, it reorganized its three specialized 
groups into TCL Group Corporation. At that 
occasion, the shares of TCL Group Corpora-
tion were divided into 59% under Huizhou 
Municipal Government's holdings, and 41% 
under the management and employees' hold-
ings. The holdings of the managers as of Janu-
ary 2001 stand as follows: Li Dongsheng, Pres-
ident, holding 5.758% of the total stock, and 
RMB Xincheng, 1.048%.27 Subsequently, TCL 
listed the shares of TCL Holdings Interna-
tional in Hong Kong, transferring its TV busi-
ness under the latter's umbrella. Thus, TCL 
group came to have two listed companies, 
namely, TCL Communication, a listed compa-
ny within China, and TCL International, a list-
ed company in Hong Kong. While TCL subse-
quently have taken steps to transfer the shares 
of its main subsidiaries to, and concentrate 
the power of control in TCL, the shares of 
these two listed companies have been concen-
trated in TCL Group Corporation, the hold-
ing company for its entire corporate group.
(iii) Kelon
In the period from 1999 to 2001, the 
top manager of Kelon was changed twice, fi rst 
from Pan Ning, the founder, to Wang Guorui, 
and then from Wang Guorui to Xu Tiefeng. 
On November 1, 2001, one day preceding the 
change in the leadership from Wang Guorui 
to Xu Tiefeng, Kelon announced that 20.4% 
of the 34.6% of the shares of Guangdong 
Kelon Electric Co. owned by Ronggui Town-
ship Government would be sold to Greencool, 
a privately owned manufacturer of refrigera-
tion medium. And on the following day, it was 
reported that a total of 8 directors of Kelon, 
including President Xu Tiefeng, submitted 
their resignation. The government is report-
ed to have the intention to sell all of the re-
maining shares under its holdings, while Gre-
encool has responded to the report with a 
comment that it is ready to increase its hold-
ings of Guangdong Kelon Electric's shares up 
to 29.9%.
A private company having a patent for 
the manufacturing of environmentally friend-
ly refrigeration medium, Greencool has its 
head offi ce in Beijing and its plants in Hubei, 
Tianjin, and other localities. In purchasing 
shares of Kelon, it established Shunde Green-
cool Enterprise Development Corporation in 
Shunde, and let it own the purchased shares. 
Greencool's purpose of buying into Kelon's 
shares is to acquire a full range of technolog-
ical capacity to manufacture not only refrig-
eration medium but also fi nal products such 
as refrigerators and air conditioners, and to 
boost its competitiveness by supplying envi-
ronmentally friendly refrigerators and air con-
ditioners. It can be concluded that through 
this purchase of Kelon's shares, the manage-
ment rights over Kelon are to be handed over 
from the founding managers to outside entre-
preneurs of a private company.
The approach to privatization adopted 
by Kelon is different from the one adopted by 
the two other household electric appliances 
manufacturers based in Shunde, namely Mid-
ea and Galanz. Both Midea and Galanz pro-
ceeded with privatization by letting their pres-
ent managers and employees purchase the 
shares held by the government. The differ-
ence in the solidity of the three companies' 
managerial systems seems to have led to the 
differences in their approaches to privatiza-
tion.
After Kelon made its decision about 
privatization, it was reported that Kelon 
Group Corporation was asked to repay bank 
loans totaling more than 400 million RMB, 
an amount fairly close to 560 million RMB, 
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the total selling price of the government-
owned shares (Southern Weekend, November 
30, 2001).
Couclusion: The Signifi cance of 
Privatization for the Company
Before concluding this paper, let us 
briefl y ponder over the question of wheth-
er Chinese corporations are being governed 
well. On the basis of the foregoing three case 
studies on the leading household electric ap-
pliances manufactures, the following points 
can be made.
A glance at the capital structure of Chi-
nese corporations, namely, the composition of 
their creditors and shareholders, reveals that 
the government is an enormously large pres-
ence. In the case of a listed company, to begin 
with, when the company becomes able to pro-
cure funds as a resulting of having been listed 
on the stock exchange, its ratio of total assets 
to liabilities usually decreases. The remain-
ing debts do not necessarily consist of borrow-
ings from banks and other fi nancial institu-
tions, but consist mostly of accounts payable 
and other forms of trade credits. This means 
that the presence of creditors is relatively in-
signifi cant. Similarly, a glance at the compo-
sition of shareholders of group corporations, 
which are the holding companies of company 
groups, reveals that shares are concentrated 
relatively heavily in the largest shareholders. 
And in the cases of state-owned enterprises 
and village and township enterprises, govern-
ments often own largest portions, and some-
times even as much as 100%, of their shares. 
Moreover, these group corporations often 
serve as the largest shareholders of the listed 
companies belonging to the groups. In other 
words, for a listed company in China, either 
the government or the holding company un-
der strong infl uence of the government is the 
largest internal shareholder, which exerts a 
decisive infl uence on its operation. 
Given this structure, there is a strong 
likelihood that a holding company under 
strong infl uence of the government will be-
have in such a way as to exploit external, mi-
nority shareholders of the affi liated listed 
company. In other words, the structure of cor-
porate governance in China works in such a 
way as to enable group corporations to be-
have just like the founding families of gi-
ant family concerns in Southeast Asia. This 
is an important factor that ought to be kept 
in mind when assessing these group corpora-
tions as potential targets of securities invest-
ment. 
Moreover, the situation wherein the 
government serves as the largest shareholder 
of a corporation entails a problem. Under the 
Chinese Company Law, it is perfectly legal for 
the government to be a shareholder of a cor-
poration. Nonetheless, the objectives of the 
government and those of corporation are of-
ten at odds with each other on many points. 
In the light of this fact, it is important for a 
corporation to deal squarely with the ques-
tion of how best it can remove the risk of the 
government's going out of control. The most 
straightforward response to this question is to 
reduce the percentage of the government's 
shareholdings, that is to say, to privatize the 
company. And corporations performing well 
are eager to reduce the ratios of the govern-
ment's shareholdings as soon as possible, and 
thereby to avoid "government risk." In the 
months or years ahead, such companies will 
show greater determination to carry out priva-
tization on their own initiative.  
(Mariko WATANABE)
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